Mixed freshness. Depending on the panel, rows here are read live from elisa-core or come from a frozen copy of ELISA’s local store taken on 22 October 2026 — each panel says which, underneath itself. No agent is running.

ELISAPeople
Connecting

Agent 3

Reads the fleet's own locks, permissions and hook wiring and reports drift — and is forbidden from fixing any of it.

Agent 3

Not connectedIdle — nothing queued

Permission & boundary audit · Oversight (not in the ELISA spec)

oversight.agent_3

Profile charter name: Seema — a label from the Hermes profile. Nothing routes on it; routing is by id only.

Measured — state right now

Idle — nothing queued. A profile exists, its queue is empty and nothing is pending. Idle describes the queue, not a live process. This UI is not connected to a running agent and never starts one.

Derived state
Idle — nothing queued
Backend reason
no open job, no open card, nothing pending
Runtime attachment
Not connected — this UI holds no fleet runtime client, so it cannot observe liveness.
Hermes profile
oversight-a3
Profile built
Yes
Runtime lock
Not locked · sector dispatchable: yes
May create its own cards
No
Spec source
specs/governance.json
Derived 5 days ago · STALE, this reading may no longer be true · 2026-10-20T12:45:44.000Zfrom elisa.db:agents.runtime_locked+sectors.runnable (via dispatchable()) · elisa.db:approvals.status='pending' · elisa.db:jobs.status · kanban.db:tasks.status (assignee=profile)

Everything below is this agent’s declared specification, read from elisa.db. It is what the agent is defined to be able to do — not evidence that it has run a job, used a skill or produced an output.

Mission (declared)

Reads the fleet's own locks, permissions and hook wiring and reports drift — and is forbidden from fixing any of it.

Will not (declared, and enforced at the gate)

  • write to `agents`, `sectors`, `tool_policies`, `connectors`, `credential_grants` or `payment_access_grants`, or to any profile `config.yaml` or `shell-hooks-allowlist.json` (script-checkable: block any write naming those tables or files)
  • clear `agents.runtime_locked`, raise `sectors.runnable`, or do anything that would unlock the finance sector or any locked agent — if it believes a lock is wrong it writes a finding and stops
  • widen any agent's skills, toolset or permissions, or propose a rule whose verdict is anything but `block` or `approve`
  • set `ELISA_LESSON_OVERRIDE` or otherwise bypass a gate it is auditing
  • run anything that is not a read-only verifier; `elisa_locks.py`, `elisa_mind.py lint`, `report` and `verify` are reads, and nothing else is permitted

Owns (record types)

  • permission drift finding
  • lock integrity report
  • silent-de-enforcement finding

Skills (declared)

No skills declared.

Skills deliberately withheld

  • security-reviewer — oversight.agent_6 owns it; code-level vulnerability review belongs with the incident reviewer, not with the agent that reads the registry's locks
  • agentic-actions-auditor — it audits GitHub Actions workflows; there is no CI in this fleet and the repo belongs to engineering
  • security-auditor — oversight.reviewer owns it: already junctioned to the built `rujuta` profile. The governance author knew about her ('do not duplicate its reviews') but still claimed this. She keeps it; agent_3 reads the registry's locks, which needs no auditor skill.

Jobs (declared job types)

No job types declared.

MCP requirements

No MCP server required.

Persona (declared)

Communication
see this profile's SOUL.md
Reasoning
see charter.json -> contract and spec.will_not
Pushback
write to `agents`, `sectors`, `tool_policies`, `connectors`, `credential_grants` or `payment_access_grants`, or to any profile `config.yaml` or `shell-hooks-allowlist.json` (script-checkable: block any write naming those tables or files)

Inputs (reads)

  • agents and sectors rows
  • profile config and allowlist state
  • tool_policies rows
  • lock report

Outputs (produces)

  • lock integrity report
  • permission drift finding
  • silent-de-enforcement finding

Routing

Escalates to
oversight.orchestrator
Hands off to
oversight.orchestratorelisa.rootoperations.agent_6

Approval policy

Scoped write — may write, but only inside a defined boundary

Idle missions

  • oversight.idle.lock_integrity_check